

5 December 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Comment on IOG Papers

1. The following are personal comments on the papers you gave me yesterday. They have not been staffed in CIA.
2. The papers are, as you noted, uneven. There are a number of disconnects and inconsistencies within and among them, most of which I assume you will be able to clean up in later drafts.
3. As I told you yesterday, the organization into problem papers and the bland language of some of them mask the importance of the DCI-SecDef relationship. A non-intelligence reader would never know that the present situation makes these two officers adversaries, and that their rivalry is the common denominator for a number of your problems. PP21-33 of our paper do the job.
4. A second problem is the attempt to treat NIE's, current intelligence, intelligence research, "warning" (whatever that is), and crisis management as separate production functions that can be separately assigned. They are all aspects of intelligence analysis and involve the same people and organizations. Within CIA, for instance, OCI plays a key role in all but research, OSR in all five, OER in all but "warning". I submit that a single organization responsible for all five on the national level is by far the most efficient route to go, whether directly under a DCI or under a subordinate organization (with the product evaluated by the DCI).

5. In this connection there is a repeated treatment of NIE's as if they were something extra-special at the apex of the pyramid. This is 1950's thinking. In fact, CIA's current intelligence, OER's economic research, and CIA's and DIA's support of SALT have more impact on national policy than any NIE. And none of them are produced through the formal interagency estimates machinery. Indeed, one of your papers notes that the major military estimates are well received but most others carry little weight. It is high time to recognize that the national estimates mystique is an emperor who has no clothes.

6. Some specifics on the "problem papers".

--#3 does not even mention the DCI's problems in dealing with [redacted]

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--#4 in its first 18 pages is far too up-beat. It conveys the impression of well-oiled machines working beautifully together. The sections on INR and Treasury are particularly Pollyanna-ish. The "problem area" section is much better.

--#6, I think, dismisses the problem posed by FOI and the Privacy Act too lightly. What is meant by "properly classified" under FOI has not yet been tested in the courts.

--#8 is a dangerous paper. Lip service is given to the DCI's responsibilities on P. 4, but on P3 and P5, DOD's primary role in crisis management and in collection tasking is asserted and by implication approved. The NCA-NSC problem is not addressed. The paper ought to note that an effort by the IC Staff to experiment with Community crisis sitreps was torpedoed by DIA's insistence that it have sole responsibility for military inputs. (See last para on p8.)

--#9 does not analyze the effect of transition uncertainties on DCI-Defense relationships in peace-time. Note also (P3) that the CRA, although still nominally in effect, presupposes the existence of World War II-style CIA "forces". These no longer exist.

7. Comments on the Options.

--#1. This has the virtue of strength and honesty. I would add as a "Con" under Tasking (P3) "Perhaps less responsive to Defense needs". Also on P3, I think a cabinet-level officer could better protect the objectivity of intelligence. On P5 under Efficiency add as a Con a reference to the broad span of DCI responsibilities. Delete the last Con; I think this would work the other way. Under Assessment, as a Pro add "one manager is clearly responsible for performance."

--#2. There isn't a chance in hell that Congress will buy this, but you ought to list it.

--#3. This looks pretty good. One would have to [redacted]

[redacted] Also, beware of any arrangement grouping NPIC with the technical collectors. It is a processor and should be linked as tightly as possible with the analysts. Putting it alongside NRO runs the risk of creating another self-contained monster like NSA. This option handles the production function well.

--#4 would be OK if it didn't break up production (see para 4 above). Also, my comment on NPIC applies here as well.

--#5 looks quite familiar. In your rework, however, the question of production and who does what has somehow gotten obscured.

--#6 I would drop forthwith. The DCI, without resource authority, would have much less clout vis-a-vis Defense than he now has. Congress would never buy the last point in Para 4, which would apparently put CIA out of forces and weapons analysis. There are a great many other things in here I simply don't understand.

--#7. I don't understand what "activating" means (third sentence on p. 1). Otherwise this would do little good, but little harm.

--#8. This is obviously a wet paper bag. Who is the NSC? Who would task NSA and NRO? How would NSC and OMB coordinate US intelligence without creating someone (a DCI?) to do it? You are now in position to say you've done it, and forget it.

--#9. Does not suggest where CIA production is to go or what it is to do. Nor does it suggest how the DCI's staff is to produce those sacrosanct national estimates. Otherwise good.

--#10 is another loser. Here we go with the NIE's again. CIA does "current production." In what fields? And who does the supporting research for estimates and current? Does DoD get national military production? (The Pro that the DCI will now be able to "tailor NIE's to Presidential policy needs" is one of the more ludicrous notions put forth lately).

8. One final general comment. Of all these only #1 and #3 as presented provide the DCI with the substantive staffing in depth he needs to carry out his other functions. And none of the papers really addresses this as a problem. The NIO's by themselves can't do it, especially if organizationally and/or physically separated from the production organizations. This and the estimates business virtually ensures that two competing production organizations at the national level will emerge.

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